Examining 7,306 IPOs from 34 countries, we find that IPOs are underpriced less in countries where existing public firms produce higher quality earnings information. This finding persists after controlling for other deal-and country-specific factors that affect IPO underpricing, and it is driven neither by the large and relatively transparent markets in the U.S. and U.K. nor by the relatively opaque Japanese market. The impact of going public in a country with relatively low earnings quality is partially offset by the use of a high-quality underwriter.
I. Introduction
Few corporate events garner more attention from researchers, practitioners, the media, and the public than initial public offerings (IPOs). Generally, the focus is on the large, sometimes spectacular, first-day gains to new issues observed not only in the U.S., but in virtually all of the s stock markets. Summarizing the findings of dozens of papers, the majority of which focus on underpricing in a single country, Loughran et al. (1994) confirm that IPOs earn positive first-day returns everywhere, and that underpricing varies dramatically across countries. What drives underpricing differences across markets is still a largely unexplored question.
Theoretical explanations of the underpricing phenomenon often propose that underpricing arises from information asymmetries between participants in the IPO process. To cite just one prominent example, Rock (1986) shows that when investors have different information sets, underpricing is necessary to induce less informed investors to bid for IPO shares in equilibrium. 1 In a recent survey of the empirical evidence, Ljungqvist (2007) concludes that information asymmetries -the cross-country underpricing variation documented in the literature may be driven by differences in the quality of information available to investors in different markets. Specifically, we are interested in whether international differences in the quality of accounting information help explain the international cross-section of IPO initial returns.
The accounting and finance literatures confirm that earnings quality influences a range of capital market outcomes. For example, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) find that in countries with greater earnings opacity, firms face a higher cost of capital. Biddle and Hilary (2006) establish that better accounting information leads to more efficient firm-level investment decisions, particularly in countries where financing comes through arms-length transactions rather than through relationships with creditors. Gelos and Wei (2005) find that emerging markets mutual fund managers invest more heavily in countries with greater transparency. Jin and Myers (2006) argue that greater opacity leads to lower firm-specific risk borne by investors and higher R-square values.
These findings, combined with the central role that information asymmetries play in IPO underpricing, give rise to our earnings quality hypothesis do firms endure higher underpricing when they go public in countries where the quality of earnings information is generally low? We approach this question in an international setting for several reasons. First, as noted above, underpricing varies dramatically across countries, and relatively little work has been done to understand why that is the case. Second, within a single country, firms operate in the same legal and regulatory environment, and that environment likely imposes some limit on the variability of earnings quality across firms. Thus, it is plausible that the quality of accounting information varies more across markets than within a single market. Third, in most cases very little accounting information is available about a particular firm prior to its IPO. An IPO prospectus typically offers little more than two years of pre-IPO financial information. This ability to capture cross-sectional earnings quality differences as of the IPO date. In contrast, the country-level earnings quality measures that we use draw upon several years of data generated by many different firms. While these measures do not provide any information on the quality of earnings from one IPO to another in a given country, they do capture differences in the information environment in which firms from different countries go public. Fourth, we are interested in whether reputable financial intermediaries, such as top-tier investment banks, play a role in mitigating the information asymmetries related to earnings quality. Given the global scope of the investment banking industry, and given the difficulties in identifying cross-sectional earnings quality variance in a single country, the question of whether investment banks mitigate earnings-related information asymmetries seems ideally suited to an international sample.
Despite the advantages of studying underpricing using an international sample, we must mention one caveat associated with our research design. Underpricing differences across countries may be influenced by omitted variables, such as differences in offering methods, which could be correlated with our earnings quality measures. Naturally we have taken many steps to minimize this possibility, for example by controlling for numerous country and deal characteristics; including offering method. In addition, we appeal to evidence that IPO pricing methods around the world are converging over time, with the U.S. bookbuilding approach dominating in most countries. For instance, Ljungqvist et al. (2003) find that in a sample of 2,143
IPOs from 65 countries, 46.2 percent were priced using the bookbuilding method in 1994, but by the end of their sample period (the first seven months of 1999), the fraction of new issues priced via bookbuilding rose to 80 percent. Similarly, Jagannathan and Sherman (2006) examine the use of auctions and bookbuilding in 46 countries and find that in all but four countries, auctions have been abandoned entirely, and auctions are rare in the few countries that still use them. In contrast, they find that the bookbuilding method has been gaining market share over time and has become the dominant pricing method in most countries. So while we cannot rule out the possibility of an omitted variables problem in our analysis, the timeliness of our sample (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) combined with our regression control variables and robustness tests reduce this problem to the extent possible.
Examining 7,306 IPO events, we find evidence of a statistically and economically significant association between country-level earnings quality and IPO-firm-level underpricing. Comparing two countries that differ in earnings quality by one standard deviation, firms going public in the country with better earnings information experience 4.8 percentage points lower underpricing (relative to a sample mean initial return of 27.5 percent). Our regression models control for many deal-specific (e.g., offer size, industry, underwriter, and underwriting method) and countryspecific (e.g., market returns, liquidity, and IPO activity) variables that influence underpricing, and our results are robust to the adoption of various minimum offer price screens. Furthermore, the link between earnings quality and underpricing is driven neither by the large and relatively transparent U.S. and U.K. markets nor by the relatively opaque market in Japan.
We also explore the influence of underwriters on underpricing and its interaction with earnings quality. We develop a measure of underwriter quality and interact it with our earnings quality measures. We corroborate findings from other recent studies, which suggest that since the early 1990s IPOs underwritten by higher quality investment banks experience higher underpricing. 2 However, better underwriters mitigate the effect of poor earnings quality on underpricing, such that firms listing in countries with relatively low earnings quality experience a net reduction in underpricing if they are backed by higher quality underwriters.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights previous research on earnings quality and IPO underpricing related to this study. Section 3 describes our sample construction and descriptive statistics. Section 4 contains our primary results on the relations between IPO underpricing and the quality of earnings and illustrates that many of the conventional variables used in single-country studies of IPO underpricing also explain the international cross-section. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
II. Earnings quality and IPOs
A number of researchers have studied the link between accounting information disclosed in the IPO prospectus and the market value of going-public firms. Essentially this strain of the literature asks whether IPO firms manipulate their financial statements to obtain a higher share price. Early papers offer modest affirmation for this hypothesis. In a study of Canadian IPOs, Clarkson et al. (1992) find that some firms voluntarily disclose earnings projections in their prospectuses, while other firms do not. Firms that choose to disclose generally report positive earnings projections, and these projections do affect the IPO offer price. However, they also find that the stock market is able to adjust for bias in these forecasts. Aharony et al. (1993) find weak evidence that U.S. firms attempt to inflate earnings prior to going public. Only among very small firms and firms with very high leverage do they find evidence of earnings manipulation around the IPO. They also find weak evidence that high-quality underwriters and auditors limit earnings management behavior. Friedlan (1994) reports that U.S. firms make income-increasing discretionary accruals in interim financial statements published in the IPO prospectus, but not in the final statements released after the IPO.
Even stronger evidence suggesting that IPO issuers manipulate the accounting numbers in their prospectuses appears in subsequent papers. Teoh et al. (1998) provide evidence that IPO firms have high issue-year earnings and abnormal accruals, followed by poor long-run earnings and negative abnormal accruals. They indicate that abnormal accruals at the IPO help explain subsequent poor stock returns. Similarly, Teoh et al. (1998) find that IPO firms that are the most aggressive in using accruals to report cash flows in excess of earnings earn 20 percent lower stock returns in the three years after the IPO compared to the firms reporting the most conservative earnings figures. Firms using accruals aggressively also issue about 20 percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. This finding leads the authors to conclude that investors naively focus on artificially high earnings reported by some firms when they go public. 3 Teoh and Wong (2002) suggest that analysts fare no better than investors at disentangling earnings manipulation at the 3 One caveat with this study is that it uses accounting data produced after the IPO rather than before to measure earnings manipulation. The reason provided by the authors is that pre-IPO data are not widely available. Our study takes advantage of data from existing public companies to characterize earnings quality in each country prior to any given IPO in that country. IPO . They find that accounting accruals predi non-issuing firms, and the predictive power is greater for discretionary rather than nondiscretionary accruals. For IPO firms, the relation between accruals and analyst forecast errors is independent of underwriter affiliation, and predicted forecast errors are strongly tied to long- All of these papers focus on the extent to which earnings manipulation leading up to the IPO between the IPO offer price and the market price established once trading begins), which is our focus. However, the accounting literature does offer several insights into the influence of accounting disclosures on IPO underpricing.
In a study of micro-cap Nasdaq IPOs, Willenborg and McKeown (2001) find that firms going public with going-concern audit opinions are more likely to delist within two years of the IPO, but these firms also endure less underpricing, consistent with the notion that the audit opinion reduces information asymmetries between issuers and investors. Jog and McConomy (2003) examine the impact of voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts in the IPO prospectus on IPO valuation and performance. They find higher underpricing for IPOs that do not include earnings forecasts, though this difference is concentrated among small firms. Schrand and Verrecchia (2005) study the relation between underpricing and the frequency of pre-IPO 5 Lewis (2006) finds that earnings and income-increasing accruals at the IPO are more persistent when the investment bank assisting the firm is more reputable. She also finds that investors capitalize earnings at higher multiples when high-reputation banks are present. disclosure and find lower underpricing for firms with more frequent disclosures prior to the IPO.
An exception is Internet firms, where this relation is reversed. They also find that more frequent disclosure ameliorates adverse selection in the aftermarket, with lower bid-ask spreads and greater depths for firms that disclosure more frequently pre- IPO. Finally, Leone et al. (2007) find
Collectively these papers, all of which focus on IPOs in a single country, suggest that accounting disclosures influence underpricing.
Our study extends this analysis to a multi-country setting to determine if earnings quality at the country level influences underpricing costs borne by firms going public in different markets.
In so doing we add to the very limited evidence on the determinants of cross-country underpricing variation as well as contribute to another strain of the literature on the quality and value of accounting information in different countries. For example, Defond et al. (2007) find that earnings announcements are more informative in countries with better overall earnings quality. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) Although common in the IPO literature, we do not impose a minimum offer price restriction.
For example, Ritter (1991) evaluates U.S. IPOs with a minimum offer price of $1 to mitigate the bid-ask bounce effect. However, imposing this filter would not only greatly reduce the number of IPOs in many countries, but it would also eliminate some countries entirely. Applying a $1 minimum offer price (converting local currency to U.S. dollars based on the exchange rate as of the IPO date) eliminates over one-third of the sample events. Thus, the main analysis presented here imposes no minimum offer price, but we do verify that our results are not driven by the inclusion of IPOs with very low offer prices. [Place Figure 1 about here]
8 Table 7 reports robustness tests using minimum offer price restrictions. In particular, the bottom 2, 5, 10, and 20 percent of offer prices are excluded from respective country-level samples. In terms of the U.S.
distribution of offer prices, these cutoffs correspond to minimums of $5, $6, $7, and $9. The main conclusions of our analysis are the same when employing any of these restrictions. Coffee (1999 Coffee ( , 2002 suggests that firms list abroad to bond themselves to foreign listing standards. For example, firms listing in the U.S. subject themselves to SEC oversight, agree to meet generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and face the scrutiny of financial intermediaries involved in the security markets. While most of our IPOs originate and list in the same country, some companies choose to list outside their home country. Most of these firms list standards, the country where the firm lists is the relevant location for this study. Table 1 shows the IPO volume and average underpricing for each country in our sample.
Average underpricing varies widely, ranging from 57.3 percent in Japan to less than 3 percent in Mexico. However, this variation appears to be largely unrelated to IPO volume. Not surprisingly, the U.S. has the most IPOs in the sample, followed closely by Japan and the U.K. The aggregate gross proceeds for the entire sample is about $573 billion of which the U.S. represents about 41 percent.
[Place Table 1 about here]
For each sample country, we calculate several earnings quality measures, described in more constructed such that a higher score implies lower quality earnings. (2003), Bhattacharya et al. (2003) , Bushman and Piotroski (2006), and La Porta et al. (1998) . For most of these measures, we provide up-to-date calculations (described below) for each of our sample countries and scale these measures such that a higher value indicates lower earnings quality.
9
The unit of observation in our regressions is the IPO firm, and the dependent variable is the first-day return. The sample mean initial return equals 27.5 percent, which is roughly double the long-run mean for U.S. underpricing. The cross-sectional standard deviation of initial returns is 52.3 percent, indicating large variations in IPO returns. Unquestionably some of this variation can be explained by deal-specific and market-specific factors not related to earnings quality, so we use the remaining variables listed in Table 2 to control for these effects.
Because the extent to which an IPO is underpriced may be influenced by the quality of the underwriter, we create an underwriter market share variable similar to that proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1991) . In our analysis, the underwriter reputation measure equals the fraction of IPO inflation-adjusted proceeds underwritten by a particular underwriter in a particular country for our sample period. Table 2 indicates that the mean underwriter has a market share of 7.2 percent.
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In some countries, underwriters can engage in price support once trading begins. 9 We do not recalculate the accounting conservatism measure or the accounting standards index, relying instead upon the values published in Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and La Porta et al. (1998) respectively.
market price begins to fall below the IPO offer price. If underwriters engage in price support to limit the occurrence of negative initial returns, then the first-day returns distribution will have a higher mean than it would have in the absence or price support. We do not have detailed data on the regulations and practices with respect to price stabilization in all countries, so we attempt to control for price stabilization activity in two ways. First, we construct a country-level proxy for price stabilization activity. If price stabilization is widespread, then we expect to see an unusually large probability mass in the distribution of first-day returns just to the right of zero and an unusually small probability mass to the left of zero. Therefore, for each country we calculate the difference in the number of IPOs with initial returns between zero and one percent and the number of IPOs with initial returns between zero and negative one percent, and then divide the difference by the total number of IPOs. The more prevalent is price stabilization in a given market the higher should be this ratio, and the higher should be average underpricing. Table 2 reports a mean price stabilization ratio of 0.007, indicating a slightly greater incidence of small positive initial returns than small negative returns. Our second approach to control for price stabilization exploits the fact that underwriters typically provide price support for a very limited time, so the effects of stabilization activities on the IPO returns distribution should diminish over time. We calculate the IPO initial return based on the market price roughly one month (22 trading days) after the IPO rather than on the first trading day, and we test to see if our regression results are robust to this change.
As suggested in numerous papers, including Ritter (1984) , underpricing tends to be higher when IPO volume is high and when overall stock market returns are high. We include two variables to control for hot market effects. First, our IPO activity measure equals the number of IPOs in a given country in each year divided by the total number of listed equities in
Datastream for that country in 2006. Therefore, this measure takes the same value for all IPOs from a single country in a particular year, but within a country it varies across time, and within a single year it varies across countries. Second, for each IPO, we calculate the return on the Datastream market index in the three months leading up to the offer. Consequently, two firms will share the same market return value only if they go public at the same time in the same country. Ellul and Pagano (2006) suggest that IPOs in less liquid markets will exhibit larger initial returns. Higher underpricing compensates IPO investors for the illiquidity risk that they bear. To control for differences in liquidity across national markets, we include a country-level stock market turnover ratio, which is defined by Beck et al. (2000) as the ratio of total value of shares traded to market capitalization.
11 liquidity relative to its size, and we expect lower initial returns in more liquid markets.
Because the state of economic development varies dramatically across our sample nations, we include a measure of economic development in our regressions. The variable, Underdevelopment is the sum of the rankings of infant mortality, Internet users per capita, literacy, unemployment rate, and paved airport runways as reported by Butler and Fauver (2006) . Freedom is updated annually, so we can match it to our sample years rather than using somewhat dated measures from older papers. 12 We also include as a control variable the updated antidirector rights index from Djankov et al. (2008) which is based on laws in place as of May 2003. The anti-director rights index is based on a collection of legal and regulatory variables related to a
Most IPO underpricing studies include measures designed to capture information asymmetries, including the natural logarithm of the offer size, which we report in Table 2 .
Because offering sizes vary widely across countries, we also construct an offer size measure that captures the size of an IPO relative to other deals in the same country. This offer size ratio equals the offer size divided by the mean offer size for a given country. 13 We obtain broadly similar results with both absolute and relative deal-size measures, so in Table 2 and in subsequent regressions we simply report natural log of the CPI-adjusted total offer size for each IPO.
[Place IPOs are underpriced less than best efforts IPOs. Sixty-one percent of the firms in our sample are taken public through a firm commitment offering, while 63 percent of the deals are bookbuilt offerings. Deals that are both firm commitment and bookbuilt represent 37.4 percent of the sample. We include dummy variables for bookbuilt deals and for firm-commitment offerings. Schipper and Smith (1986) and Prezas et al. (2000) provide evidence that equity carve-outs are underpriced less than original IPOs. To capture this effect, we include a dummy variable for carve-outs.
IV. Earnings quality

Country-level earnings quality and IPO underpricing
In this section, we ask whether earnings quality affects underpricing. We recalculate two different sets of earnings quality measures from prior studies, and we also take two other measures directly from published studies. For all measures, the underlying principle is that 14 In Japan all IPOs are priced on an integer. For Japanese IPOs, our integer dummy equals one if the offer price (in yen) is perfectly divisible by 100. indicates greater earnings management. The final metric, EM4, measures loss avoidance behavior. EM4 equals the ratio of the number of firms reporting small profits over the number of or minus one percent. The intuition for this measure is that if managers manipulate earnings to avoid showing losses, then there will be a missing probability mass in the earnings distribution just to the left of breakeven, and a higher-than-expected frequency of firms reporting earnings just above zero (see Degeorge et al. 1999 ). Therefore, the higher is the loss avoidance ratio, the greater is the incidence of loss avoidance behavior in a given country and the more opaque are the From extant research we borrow two additional variables that capture different elements of earnings quality. The first variable measures the extent to which firms recognize bad news quickly and good news slowly, i.e., accounting conservatism. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) calculate accounting conservatism measures using a sample of countries and years that substantially overlaps our sample, so we use their estimates here rather than replicating them. The accounting conservatism measures come from a regression of the following form:
where the dependent variable is net income before extraordinary items, NEG is a dummy variable equal to 1 when RET is negative, and RET is the fiscalstock.
3 captures the incremental speed of bad news recognition in earnings relative to good news. 3 = 0, then there is no difference between the speed of recognition of bad and good news 3 > 0, the firms recognize bad news faster than good news. Bushman and Piotroski estimate cross-sectional regressions for each country in 3 coefficient for each country. We borrow these estimates from Table 2 in their paper. We multiply their estimates by -1 so that a higher value indicates less conservative accounting.
All of the earnings quality variables discussed thus far are based on quantitative analysis of firm-level data. Our final earnings quality measure is the more qualitative Accounting
Standards Index from La Porta et al. (1998). La Porta et al. created this index by examining
annual reports from companies and rating them based on the inclusion or omission of 90 characteristics related to the quality of corporate disclosures. We multiply this index by -1 so that a higher value indicates weaker accounting standards. A significant disadvantage of this measure is that it is based on data from 1990, so we include it here only as an additional robustness check. Table 3 from Table 3 regressions is the IPO initial return, which is calculated as the secondary market closing price divided by the final offer price, minus one. To the extent that earnings quality is related to information asymmetry, we expect poorer earnings quality to be associated with higher underpricing on average.
[Place Table 3 about here]
Recall that for EM1, EM2, EM3, EM4, and the overall AggEM variable, a higher value means more earnings management. Therefore, our earnings quality hypothesis predicts positive indicates that poor earnings quality is associated with higher IPO underpricing.
Other results in Table 3 are broadly consistent with the extant underpricing literature. For example, smaller IPOs and IPOs taken public after a period of high market returns have higher underpricing. IPOs priced on integers endure higher underpricing as do firms going public in less liquid markets. As expected, our proxy for price stabilization indicates that underpricing is higher when price stabilization is more prevalent. We also find evidence of higher underpricing for bookbuilt and firm commitment deals, and deals that occur following a period of low IPO volume. The adjusted R-square values indicate that our models explain between twelve and thirteen percent of the variation in the international underpricing cross-section.
Economically, the earnings quality effects presented in Table 3 Therefore, we expect positive signs in the regressions. Indeed, all coefficients are positive and significant, consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is higher in countries where investors receive lower quality accounting information.
The Table 4 [Place Table 4 about here]
In Table 5 we provide a robustness check with an alternative control for price stabilization activity by underwriters. In these regressions, we measure the IPO initial return as the percentage difference between the offer price and the secondary market closing price 22 trading days after the IPO. The intuition for doing this is that the effects of price stabilization dissipate over time, generally within a month of the IPO, as reported in Ruud (1993) and elsewhere. Thus, if price stabilization temporarily obscures the left tail of the IPO returns distribution, then our finding that lower quality earnings leads to higher underpricing might be the result of greater price support in countries with lower earnings quality. Table 5 indicates that measuring the initial return over a longer horizon does not fundamentally change our results. All earnings quality measures have the expected signs and are significant, and most other results from Tables 3 and 4 carry through as well.
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[Place Table 5 about here]
The post price stabilization results reported in Table 5 Together, the results in Tables 3 through 5 suggest an important link between earnings quality and IPO underpricing.
Earnings quality and the certification effect of financial intermediaries
The idea that uncertainty, or the lack thereof, can influence underpricing is well established in the IPO literature. One mechanism that could mitigate this uncertainty is the presence of a reputable intermediary who, in effect, certifies the earnings of IPO firms. Carter and Manaster (1990) , Megginson and Weiss (1991) , Barry et al. (1991) all report results consistent with a certification effect (i.e., lower underpricing) when firms go public with the assistance of reputable underwriters or venture capital investors. 16 However, most recent underpricing studies find a positive relation between underwriter quality and initial returns. Why IPOs underwritten by more prestigious investment banks are underpriced more remains an unanswered question, but our results indicate that this pattern continues for recent years and across the globe.
In spite of the positive coefficient for underwriter reputation, underwriters can still play a role in reducing underpricing in countries with high levels of information asymmetries. In Table 6 we include an interaction between our underwriter reputation measure and each of the earnings quality measures. For example, Table 6 Model 1 includes an interaction term between the underwriter quality and aggregate earnings management measure. If higher quality underwriters certify the earnings of IPO firms and thereby reduce the uncertainty faced by investors, then we expect the interaction terms to have the opposite sign of the relevant earnings quality measure. In all four regression specifications in Table 6 , the coefficient on the interaction between underwriter reputation and earnings quality is significant and takes the opposite sign of the earnings quality coefficient.
[Place Table 6 about here]
The coefficients on the interaction terms indicate that IPO issuers benefit more from significance of this result, consider an issuer in India with an average earnings opacity score of We obtain similar results when examining the interaction between the other proxies for earnings quality and underwriter reputation. These results are consistent with underwriter reputation acting as certification for new issues and are particularly important in countries with lower earnings quality. Table 7 provides additional robustness checks. In Models 1-4 we impose increasingly stringent restrictions on our country-level sample by imposing a minimum offer price cutoff. In particular, the bottom 2, 5, 10, and 20 percent of offer prices are excluded from respective country-level samples. In terms of the U.S. distribution of offer prices, these cutoffs correspond to minimums of $5, $6, $7, and $9. Increasing the minimum offer price reduces the odds of finding spurious results driven by market microstructure effects. In this table, we report only one earnings quality measure, the aggregate earnings management score, but we obtain similar results with the other earnings quality measures. In all cases, the results indicate that an economically and statistically significant increase in underpricing occurs when earnings quality deteriorates. As before, high-quality underwriters mitigate this effect. In models 5-7, we exclude each of the three largest IPO markets in our sample, the U.S., the U.K, and Japan. We do this simply to illustrate that the earnings quality results are not driven exclusively by these markets. Excluding any of these three countries, lower earnings quality is still associated with higher underpricing.
Similarly, the underwriter certification effect persists when we impose stringent minimum offer price restrictions on the sample, or when we exclude the U.S., the U.K., or Japan.
[Place Table 7 about here]
V. Conclusion
In this paper we examine IPO underpricing across many different countries. Many of the relations documented previously in single-country studies hold up in an international setting.
However, our primary contribution is not simply to verify the robustness of established effects within the international cross-section, but to study how country-level differences in earnings informativeness influence underpricing.
Using a wide range of earnings quality measures, we find higher underpricing in countries with lower earnings quality even after controlling for many country-and deal-specific Underpricing is the first-day secondary market closing price divided by the final offer price, minus one. Line points show the average AggEM score by quartile and correspond to the right axis. AggEM is the average country i ranking across the following four earnings management measures: EM1, EM2, EM3, and EM4. EM1 is the median ratio in country i of the firm-level standard deviations of operating earnings over the cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM2 is the cross-sectional correlation in country i between the change in accruals and change in cash flows from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM3 is the median ratio in country i of the absolute value of accruals over the absolute value of cash flow from operations. EM4 is the ratio in country i of the number of firms reporting small profits over the number of firms reporting small losses. A small profit (loss) is defined as a value of net earnings scaled by lagged total assets in the range [0, 0.01] ([-0.01, 0)). This table presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 7,306 IPOs. EM1 is the median ratio in country i of the firm-level standard deviations of operating earnings over the cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM2 is the cross-sectional correlation in country i between the change in accruals and change in cash flows from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM3 is the median ratio in country i of the absolute value of accruals over the absolute value of cash flow from operations. EM4 is the ratio in country i of the number of firms reporting small profits over the number of firms reporting small losses. A small profit (loss) is defined as a value of net earnings scaled by lagged total assets in the range [0, 0.01] ([-0.01, 0)). AggEM is the average country i ranking across the following four earnings management measures: EM1, EM2, EM3, and EM4. Earnings aggressiveness is the median ratio in country i of total accruals over the lagged total assets. Earnings opacity is the average country i decile ranking across the following three earnings management measures: EM2, EM4, and earnings aggressiveness. (2006) . Accounting conservatism reported by Bushman and Piotroski is multiplied byet al. (1998) . Accounting standards index reported by La Porta, et al. is multiplied by -1. Initial return is the secondary market closing price divided by the final offer price, minus one. Underwriter reputation is the country of listing Megginson-Weiss underwriter market share measure, which is the fraction of total CPIadjusted offer value underwritten by a given underwriter for the sample. Price stabilization is the difference in the number of IPOs with small positive first day returns (greater than zero and less than or equal to one percent) and the number of IPOs with small negative first day returns (less than zero and greater than or equal to negative one percent) divided by the total number of IPOs issued in the country of listing. IPO activity is the ratio of the total number of IPOs in the issue year divided by the number of Datastream listed equities for the country of listing as of 2006. Market return is the return on the Datastream index for the country of listing over the three months preceding the offering. Stock market turnover ratio equals the ratio of the total value of shares traded to aggregate market capitalization and reported in Beck et al. (2000) .
Underdevelopment is the sum of the rankings of infant mortality, internet users per population, literacy, unemployment rate, and paved airport runways as reported by Butler and Fauver (2006) . Index of economic freedom is a product of The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal and is an aggregate measure covering the following ten freedoms: business, trade, monetary, freedom from government, fiscal, property rights, investment, financial, freedom from corruption, and labor. Antidirector rights index measures shareholder rights by considering the following issues: (1) vote by mail, (2) shares not blocked or deposited prior to shareholder meetings, (3) cumulative voting in director elections, (4) oppressed minority mechanisms, (5) pre-emptive rights to new issues, and (6) minimum capital requirements and is reported in Djankov et al. (2008) . Offer size is the CPI-adjusted offer value in millions of U.S. dollars. Indicator variables are set equal to one for integer offer price, bookbuilt, firm commitment, and equity carve-out deals. This table presents OLS regressions of IPO underpricing on country-level earnings quality measures. The dependent variable is the IPO initial return, which is the secondary market closing price divided by the final offer price, minus one. EM1 is the median ratio in country i of the firm-level standard deviations of operating earnings over the cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM2 is the cross-sectional correlation in country i between the change in accruals and change in cash flows from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM3 is the median ratio in country i of the absolute value of accruals over the absolute value of cash flow from operations. EM4 is the ratio in country i of the number of firms reporting small profits over the number of firms reporting small losses. A small profit (loss) is defined as a value of net earnings scaled by lagged total assets in the range [0, 0.01] ([-0.01, 0) ). AggEM is the average country i ranking across the following four earnings management measures: EM1, EM2, EM3, and EM4. Underwriter reputation is the country of listing Megginson-Weiss underwriter market share measure, which is the fraction of total CPI-adjusted offer value underwritten by a given underwriter for the sample. Price stabilization is the difference in the number of IPOs with small positive first day returns (greater than zero and less than or equal to one percent) and the number of IPOs with small negative first day returns (less than zero and greater than or equal to negative one percent) divided by the total number of IPOs issued in the country of listing. IPO activity is the ratio of the total number of IPOs in the issue year divided by the number of Datastream listed equities for the country of listing as of 2006. Market return is the return on the Datastream index for the country of listing over the three months preceding the offering. Stock market turnover ratio equals the ratio of the total value of shares traded to aggregate market capitalization and reported in Beck et al. (2000) . Underdevelopment is the sum of the rankings of infant mortality, internet users per population, literacy, unemployment rate, and paved airport runways as reported by Butler and Fauver (2006) . Index of economic freedom is a product of The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal and is an aggregate measure covering the following ten freedoms: business, trade, monetary, freedom from government, fiscal, property rights, investment, financial, freedom from corruption, and labor. Antidirector rights index measures shareholder rights by considering the following issues: (1) vote by mail, (2) shares not blocked or deposited prior to shareholder meetings, (3) cumulative voting in director elections, (4) oppressed minority mechanisms, (5) pre-emptive rights to new issues, and (6) minimum capital requirements and is reported in Djankov et al. (2008) . Offer size is the natural log of the CPI-adjusted offer value in millions of U.S. dollars. Indicator variables are set equal to one for integer offer price, bookbuilt, firm commitment, and equity carve-out deals. Regressions Porta, et al. is multiplied by -1. Underwriter reputation is the country of listing Megginson-Weiss underwriter market share measure, which is the fraction of total CPI-adjusted offer value underwritten by a given underwriter for the sample. Price stabilization is the difference in the number of IPOs with small positive first day returns (greater than zero and less than or equal to one percent) and the number of IPOs with small negative first day returns (less than zero and greater than or equal to negative one percent) divided by the total number of IPOs issued in the country of listing. IPO activity is the ratio of the total number of IPOs in the issue year divided by the number of Datastream listed equities for the country of listing as of 2006. Market return is the return on the Datastream index for the country of listing over the three months preceding the offering. Stock market turnover ratio equals the ratio of the total value of shares traded to aggregate market capitalization and reported in Beck et al. (2000) . Underdevelopment is the sum of the rankings of infant mortality, internet users per population, literacy, unemployment rate, and paved airport runways as reported by Butler and Fauver (2006 Dyck and Zingales (2004) . Respectively, ***, **, and * denote significance of the coefficient at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. nd secondary market closing price divided by the final offer price, minus one. AggEM is the average country i ranking across the following four earnings management measures: EM1, EM2, EM3, and EM4. EM1 is the median ratio in country i of the firm-level standard deviations of operating earnings over the cash flow from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM2 is the cross-sectional correlation in country i between the change in accruals and change in cash flows from operations (both scaled by lagged total assets), multiplied by -1. EM3 is the median ratio in country i of the absolute value of accruals over the absolute value of cash flow from operations. EM4 is the ratio in country i of the number of firms reporting small profits over the number of firms reporting small losses. A small profit (loss) is defined as a value of net earnings scaled by lagged total assets in the range [0, 0.01] ([-0.01, 0)). Earnings opacity is the average country i decile ranking across the following three earnings management measures: EM2, EM4, and earnings aggressiveness. Earnings aggressiveness is the median ratio in country i of total accruals over the lagged total assets. ed by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) . Accounting conservatism reported by Bushman and Piotroski is multiplied by -1.
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